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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals by Utah Code Annotated 78-
2A-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues identified by Defendant and Appellant are sufficient for the Court to 
Review claimed error. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Standard of Review for Findings of Fact. The reviewing court must decide 
that the findings are not adequately supported by the record resolving all disputes and 
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court or jury's determination. 
2. Determinations of Law. The standard review for questions of law is that 
of correctness, the Appellant Court owes no difference to the Trial Court's 
Determination. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 (10) 
An officer may, without a warrant arrest a person for violation at this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in 
his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that a violation was caused 
by the person. 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10 
See Addendum A 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 506 
See Addendum B 
Jury Verdict 
See Addendum C 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
Defendant was charged for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor on 
September 6, 1996 in Rich County, State of Utah. 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, requested a trial by jury. The matter was 
tried before a jury on July 7, 1997. The jury rendered a verdict of guilty. The pre-trial 
Motion to Suppress was denied by the court. The Defendant's post-trial Motion to Arrest 
a judgement was denied. 
C. Disposition in Trial Court: 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The Defendant was sentenced on September 
22, 1997. 
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D. Relevant Facts: 
On the 6th day of September, 1996 the Defendant was driving Eastbound on the 
"Monte Cristo" Road from Ogden, Utah to Woodruff, Utah. The Defendant was involved 
in a one-car roll-over which ejected the Defendant from his vehicle. 
The road in the area of the accident was a two lane straight road, mostly fields on 
one side and summer range on the other side. TR 121. There is a small bend in the road 
at the accident site TR 109. There were no visible obstructions observed by the officer 
following the accident TR 101. There is no evidence of a collision with animals, no 
collision with either livestock or other animals. There didn't "appear to be a lot of reasons 
for that to happen." Officer Dale Stacey. TR 123. The accident happened in the evening 
with the sun behind the Defendant. Skid marks on the road showed the Defendant's car 
"gone over to the left, over corrected and came back to the right." The Defendant's 
vehicle left the road and was sitting on it's wheels in a field off the south side of the road. 
TR 110. Dale Stacey, Rich County Sheriffs Deputy, was proceeding West bound, 
unaware of the accident. He had passed other East bound vehicles without being notified 
by them of the accident. TR 136. He came upon the accident, saw the skid marks on the 
road and walked to the Defendant's vehicle. TR 110. He observed damage to the vehicle 
and damage to the fence. TR 110. "And stuff was scattered down the side of the road." 
TR110. 
As the officer walked down the steep embankment and started to climb the fence 
he was confronted by the Defendant's dog, TR 111. At that time he heard the call, 
"hello?" The officer determined that the Defendant was pinned under his truck, TR 112. 
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The front wheels of the truck were in one ditch and the rear wheels of the truck were in a 
parallel ditch, TR 113. Defendant's head was in the ditch, under the rear wheel of his 
truck, TR 115. The Defendant was alone and had been ejected from his vehicle during 
the rollover. TR 129. When Deputy Stacey observed the Defendant under the truck he 
then immediately called for an ambulance from Woodruff, Utah. A second officer 
arrived by the name of James Gregory, a conservation officer stationed in Randolph, 
Utah. TR 116. Officer Gregory had driven up the road one and a half to two hours 
before being called to the scene of the accident without observing the accident. TR 161. 
Deputy Stacey smelled alcohol on the Defendant's person while the Defendant 
was pinned under his truck. TR 121. The officer arrived on the scene at approximately 
8:00 p.m. TR 124. Blood was drawn at approximately 8:40 p.m. Probable cause for the 
arrest was based upon the smell of alcohol on the Defendant and the totality of the facts 
of the accident known to the officer, as described in page 3 hereof. TR 124. The 
Defendant was placed under arrest prior to blood being drawn. TR 149. The blood was 
drawn by an EMT qualified to draw blood by the name of Kery Stacey, a brother to the 
Deputy Stacey. Kery Stacey arrived at the scene, found gas leaking from the wrecked 
vehicle near the head of the Defendant. TR 181. Defendant was extracted as soon as 
possible. EMT Stacey obtained a consent of the Defendant to draw the blood. TR 185 & 
186. He drew the blood according to established procedures and used a kit furnished by 
the State of Utah. EMT Stacey was on the scene 15-20 minutes prior to the blood draw. 
30-35 minutes had elapsed between the call to EMT Stacey and the time that he drew 
blood. 
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The blood was ultimately tested by the Utah State Toxicology lab. Exhibit 2. Toxicology 
report describes blood alcohol as follows: Blood Alcohol: 0.12% (W/V Ethanol) 
Barbara Jeppsen describes the results of the tests as a weight by volume. TR 234. The 
blood test was admitted into evidence without objection by Defendant's counsel. TR 
255. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence available to Deputy 
Stacey to provide probable cause for the arrest of the Defendant. The State claims that 
the articular facts in this case, as shown by the testimony of the officer, provide 
substantial probable cause for the arrest under the provisions of 41-6-44(10). 
2. Secondly, Defendant claims that the Deputy exceeded his authority in 
requiring the Defendant to submit to a blood test. It is the State's position that the 
Deputy, having found probable cause to arrest the Defendant, was, therefore, authorized 
by law, under the provisions of 41-6-44.10 to request blood from the Defendant for the 
purpose of determining alcohol content. The State further argues that the record is devoid 
of any facts showing coercion of the Defendant by the officer in requesting consent to 
take blood. 
3. Defendant claims that the State failed to present evidence establishing the 
elements of the offense charged, namely that the Defendant was guilty of having a blood 
alcohol content of .08 percent greater by weight. The State contends that the toxicology 
report clearly shows that the blood alcohol content of the Defendant was measured by 
weight and by percentage, which evidence is supported by the testimony of the 
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toxicologist. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CLAIMS THE DEPUTY LACKED 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST MR. BREITWEISER. 
The first issue claimed by the Defendant is whether or not there was sufficient 
attenuation between the illegal arrest of Mr. Breitweiser and the blood draw. Therefore, 
the first question must be whether or not there was an illegal arrest. 
A. State claims that the arrest was based upon probable cause. 
Defendant appears to assume that the arrest was unlawful. The trial court found 
that there was sufficient probable cause for the officer to arrest the Defendant. 
Section 41-6-44 (a)(10) provides that a peace officer may, without a warrant, 
arrest a person without a warrant arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, 
although not in his presence and if the officer has probable cause to believe that 
the violation was committed by the person. 
Neither party has alleged that there were other persons in the Defendant's vehicle. 
However, there was a dog present. Therefore the sole question under the provision is 
whether or not there is probable cause for the officer to arrest the Defendant for the 
violation. 
Defendant would have this court believe that the only evidence before the court 
was the officers detection of the smell of alcohol upon the person of the Defendant while 
the Defendant was under the vehicle. The record shows substantial other indicia of 
driving under the influence of alcohol. 
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This court could reasonable conclude that, absent substantial mechanical 
malfunction, automobiles do not leave the road in the pattern described by the officer. 
That pattern is produced by the driver. The one car roll-over took place approximately 
seven miles west of Woodruff, Utah, on a two lane, relatively straight road without 
obstructions. TR 121. The vehicle drifted to the left which would be across the center 
line (a violation of 41-6-53 Utah Code annotated 1987 as amended). The driver then over 
corrected to such an extent that he left a critical scuff mark on the road. TR 121, overshot 
the right hand lane of the road, went off the road to the right, down a steep embankment, 
through a fence, and into a ditch. TR 121. There was no evidence of an obstruction in 
the road such as animals, nor did the Defendant say anything about an obstruction in the 
road. TR 117. Additionally, the Defendant admitted to consuming an alcoholic 
beverage. TR 120. 
The totality of the evidence, not just the admission by the Defendant to consuming 
alcohol, gives rise to a reasonable officer finding probable cause. Layton City vs. Noon, 
736 P.2d 1035 (Utah app. 1987). 
In determining whether Officer Robinett had probable cause to arrest Noon for 
driving under the influence of alcohol we must ask: 
Whether or not from the facts known to the officer, and the influences which 
fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in this position 
would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense. 
There must be a distinction drawn between cases of reasonable suspicion to stop 
and probable cause to arrest. In this case the issue relating to reasonable suspicion to stop 
is nonexistent. The Defendant was stopped and had been stopped for some period of time 
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while lying underneath his vehicle. The sole question becomes whether or not there is 
probable cause to arrest. This is a question of fact which the court found in favor of the 
Plaintiff. 
Prior to the time of the arrest there was no illegal conduct committed by the State 
which was alleged nor proved by the Defendant and therefore the doctrine of attenuation 
found in State vs. Hamm, 910 P.2d 433 (Utah App., 1996) is inapplicable to this case. 
Defendant's Brief, p. 13. 
B. The second issue under this point is whether or not the Defendant 
voluntarily consented to have the blood drawn. The Defendant, on page 14 of his brief, 
contends that because of the proximity of the arrest to the request for the drawing of 
blood and the absence of intervening circumstances, the arrest statement was an attempt 
to demonstrate police authority and impliedly conveys a threat. 
Not withstanding the Defendant's injuries, he was able to communicate during his 
extraction from the vehicle as to where he hurt. And following his extraction of the 
vehicle he was able to accurately communicate with the officer concerning his admission 
that he had consumed alcohol. TR 120. If the officer had placed the Defendant under 
arrest, having determined the probable cause existed for the arrest, then the consent to 
draw the blood is a statutory procedure provided in 41-6-44.10 (2) (a). 
Whether consent was voluntarily given is a question of fact to be determined from 
the totality of the circumstances. State vs. Robinson 797 P.2d. 437 (Utah App. 1990), at 
page 437, which says as follows: 
Two factors determine whether consent to search is lawfully obtained following 
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police action that violates the fourth amendment such as the unlawful detention 
here: 
1. The consent must be voluntary in fact 
2. The consent must not be obtained by police exploitation of prior illegality. 
In this case there is no prior illegality, so the sole question is whether or not the 
consent was voluntarily given. Quoting further from State vs. Robinson: 
Whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress 
or coercion, expressed or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the 
totality of all the circumstances. 
Quoting from State vs. Hamm at page 439, infra: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
unequivocal and specific and was freely and intelligently given: 
(2) The government must prove that consent was given without duress or 
coercion, expressed or implied. 
(3) (When evaluating these first two standards, we) indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and 
there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived." 
The Defendant's sole claim to the involuntary consent given is the fact that the 
officer arrested the Defendant prior to requesting consent to draw blood. Brief page 14, 
Defendant claims the officer was on a fishing expedition because he did not possess 
sufficient subjective facts to support a probable cause for the arrest. Defendant criticizes 
the arresting officer for not asking the Defendant to perform field sobriety tests. The 
Defendant criticizes the arresting officer for not giving the Defendant the admonition 
found in the DUI report form. Defendant's brief addendum D. However, the admonition 
is only required following the Defendants refusal. See 41-6-44.10.a 
C. Defendant claims the blood draw and the results privileged. 
The arresting officer, Dale Stacey, is a Rich County EMT. His brother Kery 
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Stacey, a mechanic-cattleman, is also an EMT in Rich County. EMT stands for 
"Emergency Medical Technician." They are not licensed physicians, mental health 
therapists, social worker, marriage counselor, family therapists, advanced practical 
nurses, designated as registered psychiatric mental health nurse specialists or professional 
counselors. 
An EMT is what the name applies and nothing more. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence found in Addendum B do not specify an EMT as 
being either a physician or a mental health therapist. The definition of patient is one who 
consults or is examined by a physician or mental health therapist. 
The record is totally devoid of any evidence by the Defendant that he reasonably 
believed Kery Stacey or Dale Stacey to be a licensed physician or mental health therapist. 
The record is devoid of any evidence that any communication by the Defendant 
was communicated in confidence for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the Defendant 
for mental illness. 
There is no need to look at the exceptions (d) to the rule, as the rule itself is 
inapplicable to this situation. The trial court erred in giving application to the rule under 
the circumstances, however that error by the court did not substantially affect the outcome 
of the trial. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT CLAIMS THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY 
DENIED THE MOTION TO ARREST JUDGEMENT. 
Following the trial the Defendant made a motion to arrest judgement under Rule 
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32 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The substance of Rule 23 is as follows: 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court, upon its own motion 
may, or upon the motion of a Defendant, shall arrest judgement if the facts proved 
or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the Defendant is mentally ill, or 
there is cause for the arrest of judgement. Upon arresting judgement the court 
may, unless a judgement of acquittal of the offense charge is entered or jeopardy 
has attached, order a commitment until the Defendant is charged a new or retired, 
or may enter any other order as may be just and proper under the circumstances. 
The information by the state charged the Defendant with operating a vehicle 
having a blood content of .08 or greater. 
The requirement of the statute is grams of alcohol per hundred milliliters of blood. 
Therefore, 8 grams of alcohol per hundred milliliters of blood is equal to .08 percent 
blood alcohol. Exhibit 2, which is the results of the examination of the blood by the Utah 
State Department of Toxicology, finds the results as follows: 
"Blood alcohol: 0.12% (w/v) ethanol" 
The witness, Barbara Jeppsen, a toxicologist for the State of Utah, testified that 
she examined the blood drawn from the Defendant and that it contained .12%. TR 222. 
Witness further explained that the method of analyzation was weight by volume. TR 234 
L23. 
Instruction 2 as approved by the Defendant asked the jury to determine a finding 
as follows: "That while operating said vehicle or while being in actual physical control of 
the vehicle at the time and place alleged, he had a .08 gram breath alcohol content or 
greater." 
The instruction was talked about in chambers prior to being given to the jury and 
Defendant's counsel agreed upon the language. TR 273 - 4. It is this instruction that Mr. 
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Oliver now claims as being error. 
Counsel cannot assist in the inducement of error by the court and then claim error 
upon appeal. The verdict in this case signed by the jury is consistent with the statute. 
Addendum C. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant attempts to demonstrate to this court error committed by the State of 
Utah by infusing into the fact situation evidence not presented at trial and conclusions not 
reasonably drawn from the evidence. 
Reducing this case to the simple logic leaves but one conclusion and that is that 
the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant, taking into consideration all facts 
and circumstances of the accident including the smell of alcohol upon the Defendant's 
person. The consent to take blood alcohol was obtained after arrest which is not in and of 
itself coercive. Therefore, the judgement and conviction of the Defendant should be 
affirmed.
 n 
DATED this /C_ day of h/Xt , 1 9 9 8 . / V 
/ / / / 
/ George W. Preston 
^ Rich County Attorney 
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I, George W. Preston, Rich County Attorney, certify that on the day of June, 
1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE upon Counsel for the 
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DATED this _ _ _ day of June, 1998 
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ADDENDUM A 
41-6-43.5 MOTOR VEHICLES 144 
(b) a certificate of insurance issued under Section 41-12a-402; 
(c) a certified copy of a surety bond issued under Section 41-12a-405; 
(d) a certificate of the state treasurer issued under Section 41-12a-406; 
(e) a certificate of self-funded coverage issued under Section 41-12a-
407; or 
(f) information that the vehicle or driver is insured from the Uninsured 
Motorist Identification Database Program created under Title 41, Chapter 
12a, Part 8. 
(8) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and shall be fined not less 
than $100, who: 
(a) when requested to provide security information under Subsection 
(1), or Section 41-12a-303.2, provides false information; 
(b) falsely represents to the department that security required under 
this chapter is in effect; or 
(c) sells a vehicle to avoid the penalties of this section as applicable 
either to himself or a third party. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-35.5, enacted by L. (2)(d) and (7)(f); inserted "and other informa-
1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 2; 1987, ch. 138, tion available to the peace officer does not 
§ 28; 1988, ch. 98, § 2; 1993, ch. 202, § 1; indicate that owners or operator's security is in 
1993, ch. 234, § 30; 1997, ch. 51, § 1. effect" in Subsection (4)(a); redesignated former 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- Subsection (4)(c) as Subsection (4)(b)(iv); and 
ment, effective May 5, 1997, added Subsections made numerous stylistic changes. 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
41-6-43.5. Definitions. 
As used in this article, "vehicle" or "motor vehicle," in addition to the 
definitions provided under Section 41-6-1, includes off-highway vehicles as 
defined under Section 41-22-2. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43.5, enacted by L. became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
1996, ch. 121, § 1. Utah Const., Art. VI, Section 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 121 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Operation of mopeds and motor- vehicles as within scope of driving while intoxi-
ized recreational two-, three-, and four-wheeled cated statutes, 32 A.L.R.5th 659. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concen-
tration — Measurement of blood or breath alco-
hol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revoca-
tion of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
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lg under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reck-
less driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related 
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments 
administered under 10 U.S.C. 815; 
(b) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordi-
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
and 
(c) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) 
is guilty of a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor; or 
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or 
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time 
of the offense. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not 
less than 24 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate; and 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) For a violation committed after July 1,1993, the court may order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilita-
tion facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility determines that the person has a problem condition involving 
alcohol or drugs. 
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(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within six years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not 
less than 80 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate; and 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a: 
(i) class A misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (ii); and 
(ii) third degree felony if at least: 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after 
April 23, 1990; or 
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after 
July 1, 1996. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a fine of not less than $2,000 and impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 240 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail 
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be> a sen-
tencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the 
program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term 
closely supervised follow-through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(c) Under Subsection (a)(ii) if the court suspends the execution of a 
prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,000 hours; and 
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol 
or drug dependency rehabilitation program providing intensive care 
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-
through after treatment. 
(7) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section 
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked 
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person 
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that: 
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(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, educa: r, 
t reatment, arid rehabilitation ordered for " -v^H^i-r. committc1 
July 1, 1993, have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for n >n and n:
 a-
tion costs assessed against the person have bc^;. ^ i d , if the COL. iuion 
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner 
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed 
ifter July 1, 1993. 
iai (i) The provisions in s u b s e c t i o n s (4), (5), and it quire a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: , ,ate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
A; ,~„ on of the 
bilitation 
"i-
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the 
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependei 
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol u 
dency rehabilitation facility; or do a combination "r ^
 b s , 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41 >r 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or 
t reatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or 
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court 
would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), 
and (6). 
(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any 
community-based or other education program provided for in this section 
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services. 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, 
an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall 
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or 
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts tha t shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-44.6 or of 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this subsection. 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of i p :3i S' : n :: : n i ::t EJC! 
for the first time under Subsection (2); 
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57-7-111; L. 1949, ch . 65, § 1; 
§ 1; 1967, ch . 88, & 2; 1969, ch . * 
ch . 268, § 3; 1979, ch . 243. § 1 
§ 2; 1982, ch . 46, § 1;1~* 
ch . 103, § 1; 1983, ch . 
H96, ch. 223, 
— The 1994 amend-
V . M . r . h TT 1C>94, 
ted 
(12)(b). 
U,r ~U Or ~ 
or ^ ive 
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>ec-
»ve 
ns 
ird 
he 
uuiucnte, auuea ^uosections (tij(a)1 c ' 
making related redesignation an c e 
changes; in Subsection (6)(a) addec e" 
quent"; in Subsection (6)(a)(i) substi s s 
A" for "class B"; and made stylistic 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 71, el 
1, 1996, added Subsections (l)(a) a n d ^ 1 3 ' 
redesignated former Subsection (1) a# (2j(a, 
and (2Kb) and former Subsection (2) a* (2)(c); 
revised and redesignated former Subsections 
(3)(b) and (3)(c) as Subsections (1Kb) and (l)(c): 
in Subsection (5)(a) substituted "If a person is 
convicted under Subsection (2)" for "Upon a 
second conviction for a violation committed 
and "conviction" for "violation"; rewrote Subsec-
ons (9)(a)(i) and 
. . . ~~ ^ -^ as a prior con-
viction" after "41-6-45"; deleted former Subsec-
tion (9)(b), relating to prior convictions, and 
redesignated the following subsections accord-
ingly; rewrote Subsections (10)(b) and (10)(c); 
added Subsection (12)(a)(iii); and made stylistic 
dtiangfes. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 223, effective 
^uly 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection 
7)(c)(ii) providing completion of an alcohol and 
drug dependency rehabilitation program as an 
alternative to incarceration, and redesignated 
former Subsection (7)(c)(i) as (7)(c); added Sub-
sections (4)(c)(ii) and (5)(c)(ii) making related 
redesignation changes; substituted "all or par t 
of a jail sentence" for "jail" throughout; in 
Subsection (6)(b)(i) added "fine of not less than 
$900, but not more than $1,000 and a"; in 
Subsection (6)(b)(iii) and (7)(d) added 'fine"; in 
Subsection (6)(c)(i) substituted "$2,000, but not 
more than $5,000" for "$1,000"; in Subsection 
(7)(b) substituted "$3,000 but not more than 
$10,000" for "$1,000"; in (7)(c) deleted "but only 
if the court enters in writing on the record the 
reason it finds the defendant should not serve 
the jail sentence"; and made stylistic and re-
lated changes. 
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
deleted maximum penalties throughout Sub-
sections (4) to (6), inserted the references to 
§ 41-6-44.6 throughout Subsections (8) and (9), 
and made numerous stylistic changes. 
Coordinat ion c lause . — Laws 1996, ch. 71, 
ch. 220, and ch. 223 all amended this section. 
Chapter 220, § 3 directed that the amendments 
to Subsection (6) in ch. 220 supersede the 
amendments to Subsections (6) and (7) in ch. 
71; ch. 223, § 5 directed tha t the amendments 
to Subsection (6) in ch. 220 supersede the 
amendments to Subsections (6)(a), (6)(b), and 
(7) in ch. 223. 
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(2) alleged violations of Section 53-3-227 >prson 
operating a vehicle while the person's drivi _0 ^ _ or 
revoked for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies 
with the requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 
76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with 
violating as a result of a plea bargain after having been originally charged 
with violating one or more of those sections or ordinances. 
His to ry : C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, e n a c t e d \\ .. <1) 
1983, ch . 102, § 1; 1987, ch . 138, § 40; 1990, . • • * ; / > >e" 
ch . 299, § 2; 1991, ch . 147, § 2; 1993, ch . 234 
§ 34; 1994, ch . 180, § 2; 1996, ch . 47, § I •<• 
1996, ch. 71, § 2. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or Sec- cuon U J . 
tion 41-6-44.6" at the end of Subsection (1). .s section is set out as reconciled by t 
The 1996 amendment, by ch. 47, effective > of Legislative Research and (>m-
April 29, 1996, substituted "Section 41-6-44" for uuiisei. 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcoho 
or drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning 
repor t — Hearing, revocation of license — Ap 
peal — Person incapable of refusal — Results oi 
test available — Who may give test — Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have 
given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine 
for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 53-3-231, while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any 
drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are administered at the 
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have 
been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 
41-6-44 or 53-3-231, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any 
other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to 
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select 
the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any 
specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a 
peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or 
administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit 
to the requested test or tests 
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pnsp in any criminal, civil < 
a person's refusal to subn..: 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then u 
by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemi' 
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical t n e 
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the w,^
 v* ^^^ wiat 
a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the 
person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if the person does not 
immediately request tha t the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace 
officer be administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf 
of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver License 
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a 
motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of 
the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver 
License Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing 
before the Driver License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by the 
Driver License Division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after 
the date of the arrest , tha t he had grounds to believe the arrested person 
had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under 
Section 41-6-44 or 53-3-231, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that 
the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under 
Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person win - Driver Lice Muns 
m f-cm t-iriTi ac t ion 
»iiu oe made in writing within ten 
j „ . „ . i . a t . 
(iii) Upon written rer^.t^t, the division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard *v ithin 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a 
hearing before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in 
the state is revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest 
for a period of: 
(A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person., has had a previous license sanction 
after July 1, 1993, under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 
or 53-3-231 or a conviction after Julv 1 1 993, under Section 
41-6-44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the Driver 
License Division *V u r a r i n g -hall hn documented ~~H -h~ n c^*— *u~ 
issues of: 
(i) whethe - «-Ti -.t ! *: .• .„? 
person was ( 
41-6-44.6, or 
(ii) whether the person refused to -uomit tu the test. 
;t a 
.14 
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(g) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized 
agent: 
(A) may administer oatiio 
attendance of witnesses and ti 
papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace 
officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees d u d i i i i i * > > 
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates 
Section 21-5-4. 
(h) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division deterv \- * . Uic 
person was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests ..v.: tj.-ed to 
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver 
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division 
shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah 
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction 
after July 1,1993, under this section, Section 53-3-223, 41-6-44.6, 
or 53-3-231 or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section 
41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the 
person, in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), 
a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's 
driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed 
court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection 
that the revocation was improper, 
(i) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License 
Division under this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. 
Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering 
him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to 
not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or 
tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may 
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation 
does not apply to taking a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws 
a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason to 
believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility 
at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal 
liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
157 TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-44.30' 
e a: >.-j 
iy issue subpoenas i 
p r i o r i n f r*f i f", . n i t !J<H ,11.' 
•-i-^u:.L~ oi necessary peace 
ees and mileage from the 
'h the rates established in 
ivision determines that the 
test or tests and refused to 
to appear before the Driver 
:he Driver License Division 
:e a motor vehicle in Utah 
a period of: 
applies; or 
d a previous license sanction 
Section 53-3-223, 41-6-44.6, 
iily 1, 1993, under Section 
i also assess against the 
ler Subsection 53-3-205(14), 
be paid before the person's 
dministrative costs, 
rson obtains an unappealed 
wed under this subsection 
the Driver License 
1C1. 
lie* „ , , -
he perjr 
fi
 *TiaL 
es. 
pcdLc , ui preciucit • 
direction <*f -A peace officer. 
..r tests admin-
* to submit to a chemical test or 
' " ~ consult an attorney or 
s a condition for the 
(7) For the purpose of 
tests, the person to be tested does 
have an attorney, physician, or c 
taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, combination of 
alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
History: C. 1953,41-6-44.10, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 43; 1983, ch. 99, § 16; 1987, 
ch. 129, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 41; 1987, ch. 
161, § 143; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, §§ 3, 4; 
1988, ch. 148, § 1; 1990, ch. 30, § 21; 1992, 
ch. 78, § 3; 1993, ch. 161, § 2; 1993, ch. 193, 
§ 2; 1993, ch. 205, § 3; 1993, ch. 234, § 35; 
1994, ch. 180, § 3; 1996, ch. 71, § 3; 1997, ch. 
10, § 61. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6" 
twice in Subsection (l)(a) and once in Subsec-
tion (2)(d); substituted "Section 41-6-44.4, 41-6-
• ..r ' - ; J23T'for -e -
44 4" in Mibb^ction ^Mejliviip 
44 4. or 44 6-44 6" in Sut> 
substituted 13-3-223" for "4 
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)f Subsection (8). 
»* * effective July 1, 
"41-6-44.4" 
* *> 
,d 
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is i t 
1996, 
' thro ugh-
nt. effective May 5, 1997, 
reference in Subsection 
J fi'» 
i s iONS 
te^t Cited in Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 997 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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 taken at the direction of a 
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated: subse-
quent consent to sobriety test as affecting ini-
tial refusal, 28 A.L.R.5th 459. 
41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment! of vehicles by 
peace officers — Impound r equ i rements - 11 
moval of vehicle by owner. 
(1) (a) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vehicle for violating 
Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section 
41-6-44 which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the officer shall: 
(i) seize and impound the vehicle, except as provided under " 
section (2); and 
(ii) remove and seize or cause to be removed or seized, the vehicle's 
license plates and registration materials if the operator is a registered 
owner of the vehicle. 

ADDENDUM B 
"53 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 506 
(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to • 
matter of common interest between two or more clients u 
the communication was made by any of them to a iawye.* 
retained or consulted in common, when offered in 
action between any of the clients. 
505. Government informer. 
Definitions. As used in this rule: 
11) "Government" means the government of the United 
States, of any state, or of any subdivision of any state. 
(2) "Informer" means any person who has furnished 
information relating to or assisting in an investigation of 
a possible violation of law to a law enforcement officer. 
(3) "Law enforcement officer" includes peace officers, 
prosecutors, a member of a legislative committee or its 
staff conducting an investigation and a member of a 
regulatory agency or its staff conducting an investigation. 
b) General rule of privilege. The government has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of an informer. 
ic) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be 
claimed by counsel for the government or in the absence of 
counsel by another appropriate representative, regardless of 
whether the information was furnished to an officer of the 
United States government or a state or a subdivision thereof. 
A i Rvneptions: voluntary disclosure; informer as wit-
rivilege exists under this rule if the identity of the 
.,„«, m.. or the informer's interest in the subject matter of the 
informer's communication has been disclosed to those who 
would have cause to resent the communication by a holder of 
the privilege or by the informer's own action, or if the informer 
appears as a witness for the government. 
(1) Testimony on merits. If it appears from the 
evidence in the case or from other showing by a party that 
an informer may be able to give testimony necessary to a 
fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence in a 
criminal case or of a material issue on the merits of a civil 
case whether or not the government is a party, and the 
government invokes a privilege, the judge may give the 
government an opportunity to show in camera facts 
relevant to determining whether the informer can, in fact, 
supply the testimony. The judge may make such orders 
respecting the procedures to be followed as are consistent 
with the spirit and purpose of this rule. If the judge finds 
there is reasonable probability that the informer can give 
the testimony, and the government elects not to disclose 
the informer's identity, the judge, on motion of the defen-
dant in a criminal case, shall dismiss the charges to which 
the testimony would relate, and the judge may do so on 
the judge's own motion. In civil cases, the judge may make 
any order that justice requires. Evidence submitted to the 
judge may be sealed and preserved to be made available to 
the appellate court in the event of an appeal, and the 
contents shall not otherwise be revealed without consent 
of the government. All counsel and parties shall be per-
mitted to be present at every stage of the proceedings 
under this subparagraph, except a showing in camera at 
which no counsel or party shall be permitted to be 
present. 
(2) Legality of obtained evidence. If information 
from an informer is relied upon to establish the legality of 
the means by which evidence was obtained and the party 
attacking the legality of obtaining the evidence makes a 
substantial preliminary showing that the law enforce-
ment officer intentionally or knowingly or with reckless 
disregard for truth falsely swore that the information was 
received from an informer reasonably believed to be 
reliable or credible and that probable cause does not exist 
absent the information furnished by the informer, the 
judge may require the identity of the informer to be 
disclosed. The judge shall, on request of the government, 
direct that the disclosure be made in camera. All counsel 
and parties concerned with the issue of legality shall be 
permitted to be present at every stage of the proceeding 
under this subparagraph, except a disclosure in camera, 
at which no counsel or parties shall be permitted to be 
present. If disclosure of the identity of the informer is 
made in camera, the record thereof shall be sealed and 
preserved to be made available to the appellate court in 
the event of an appeal, and the contents shall not other-
wise be revealed without consent of the government. 
Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-pa-
tient. 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is exam-
ined or interviewed by a physician or mental health 
therapist. 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably 
believed by the patient to be licensed, to practice medicine 
in any state. 
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or 
is reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed or 
certified in any state as a physician, psychologist, clinical 
or certified social worker, marriage and family therapist, 
advanced practice registered nurse designated as a regis-
tered psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or pro-
fessional counselor while that person is engaged in the 
diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, 
including alcohol or drug addition. 
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is com-
municated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or 
treating the patient, a patient has a privilege, during the 
patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment pro-
vided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health 
therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the 
patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a 
physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are 
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction 
of the physician or mental health therapist, including guard-
ians or members of the patient's family who are present to 
further the interest of the patient because they are reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the communications, or 
participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the direc-
tion of the physician or mental health therapist. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be 
claimed by the patient, or the guardian or conservator of the 
patient. The person who was the physician or mental health 
therapist at the time of the communication is presumed to 
have authority during the life of the patient to claim the 
privilege on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to 
a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, 
mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any 
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any 
claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any 
proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition 
as an element of the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For commu-
nications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospital-
ize the patient for mental illness, if the mental health 
therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has 
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court ordered examination. For communica-
tions made in the course of, and pertinent to the purpose 
of, a court-ordered examination of the physical, mental, or 
emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or 
witness, unless the court in ordering the examination 
specifies otherwise. 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF RICH 
STATE OF UTAH, j 
PLAINTIFF j JURY VERDICT 
VS 1 
CASE NO. 9 6 - D I - l l 
LARRY H. BREITWEISER, 
DEFENDANT j 
We che j u r o r s du ly impaneled f i nd t h e Defendant, L a r r y H. 
B re i twe i s e r , 
Guilty of Driving with a .08 grams Alcohol Content or 
greater, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
Not Guilty of Driving with a .08 grams Alcohol Content or 
Greater, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
Dated: 
Foreperson 
